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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/05/2006 Accident number: 308 
Accident time: 10:05 Accident Date: 20/06/2000 
Where it occurred: Kaniaskan MF, 
Halabja district, Said 
Sadiq 
Country: Iraq 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 30/06/2000 
ID original source: AJ/JJ/HH Name of source: UN/JJ/ELS 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: Type 72 AP blast Ground condition: agricultural (recent) 
Date record created: 19/02/2004 Date  last modified: 19/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: MAG/S/0062 MF Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
 
Accident report 
A UNOPS MAP Board of Inquiry was instigated and the following BOI report provided. For 
unexplained “political” reasons, the original report was not provided. What was provided had 
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been heavily “censored”. The original UNOPS BOI report was provided from another source 
and is reproduced under Related papers.  The following censored report has been edited to 
allow it to read smoothly. See also Related papers. 
The BOI visited the site on 21/06/00. 
The victim had been employed as a deminer for “nearly 2 years”. His last refresher/retraining 
course had been in January 2000.  
The working area had formerly been a confrontation line. The land was “flat to mildly 
undulating agriculture land (wheat)”. The accident occurred approximately 250 metres from 
the task site Control point, at a point where “the wheat is fairly dense which makes the task of 
looking for mines very difficult”.  
The victim had just returned to work after a rest break. He was engaged in clearing using 
normal manual clearance methods with a metal detector, a small hand trowel and a bucket. 
He was wearing a helmet and visor and a ROFI frontal apron. The victim was clearing away 
dirt from two detector readings. At about 10:05, during the transfer of spoil from the 
excavations to a bucket behind him, the victim dropped soil from the trowel. The soil landed in 
a non-cleared area and detonated a Type-72 anti-personnel blast mine. 
The casualty received blast injuries to his face with Impregnation of multiple foreign bodies to 
his face and both eyes. His right eye was lost and his left eye damaged. 
The victim ran out of the lane past his number two into a cleared area about 80 metres away 
where “he was finally stopped and given initial first aid treatment. The casualty was then 
transported directly to emergency hospital where he was stabilized.”  
“There was minor damage to the casualty’s vest, and although repairable due to bloodstains 
will probably have to be destroyed. There was also minor blast damage to the helmet and 
visor but this should be repairable.” 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the victim was wearing his PPE (visor and vest) correctly. 
“It is the opinion of BOI that the accident could not be attributed to any neglect carelessness 
nor misconduct of any individual or group. There was also no evidence whatsoever of any 
misuse of drugs, alcohol, or medication involved. All personnel involved compiled with all 
applicable orders instructions and safety precautions.”   
 
Recommendations  
The BOI made the following recommendations: 
a) That no disciplinary action is taken against any member of the contractors staff. 
b) That serious thought be given to where the deminer places his bucket whilst in the process 
of removing spoil. 
c) The process of removing soil from an excavation to a bucket is to be conducting in the 
kneeling position, and within the confines of the clearance lane - no part of any deminers 
tools, equipment or body should be above uncleared ground. 
d) That either that Tetrarinc vests or a less cumbersome version be trailed for possible 
introduction, or the Rofi vests be modified some how to offer better neck protection  
e) That authority to transfer a Manual Clearance Contractor patient be delegated to the 
appropriate in country representative of that organization and that the Manual Clearance 
Contractor and safety supervisor be solely responsible for all transference and evacuation 
procedures. This should be especially so in the case of a life threatening injury (this should 
also apply to both in and out – off – country evacuations).   The board recommends that PM 
of Manual Clearance Contractor (in side the country) being negotiations with HQ of Manual 
Clearance Contractor (out side country) to rectify this matter. 
See Related papers. Appendices referenced in the report were not made available. 
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Summarised Statements from the Team Leader, Site Commander, Witnesses and the victim 
were not made available.  
  
Victim Report 
Victim number: 388 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Helmet 
Short visor 
Protection used: Helmet; frontal apron 
 







No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The analysis of this accident was hampered by the fact that the full report of the Board of 
Inquiry, including statements of witnesses, was not made available through UNOPS. When it 
was sourced from elsewhere, it was found that UNOPS had failed to provide the medevac 
facilities that their contract with the demining group obliged them to provide (see Related 
papers). A desire to conceal this may be the reason for the BOI to be withheld. The MAC’s 
failure to honour its contract (and the apparent ignorance of the investigators regarding the 
MAC’s obligations) constitute a serious “Management/control inadequacy”. 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the victim 
was working in an unsafe manner (whatever he was doing) with his visor raised and this error 
went uncorrected.  
“There was minor damage to the casualty’s vest, and although repairable due to bloodstains 
will probably have to be destroyed. There was also minor blast damage to the helmet and 
visor but this should be repairable.” 
The members of the BOI should be advised that ALL PPE damaged in an explosive accident 
should be destroyed, not repaired. 
The BOI explanation of the events leading to this accident is unconvincing. The force required 
to detonate a Type-72 is 5-10kg – which would require a rather large lump of soil to be 
dropped from a great height. As exposed Type-72s age, their rubber tops decay and dirt gets 
inside, often making them more difficult to initiate. It is possible that the mine had been 
damaged by previous fire in a peculiar manner, but it is hard to see how that would make the 
Belville spring inside more sensitive.  
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The Board of Inquiry’s conclusion that the victim was wearing his visor correctly is made 
without evidence and is also unconvincing. The visor must have been at least partly raised for 
the wearer to sustain such severe eye injury. 
 
Related papers 
Access to the following accident report was denied by MAC officers for unexplained “political 
reasons”. It was supplied by another source. The “political reasons” may be explained by the 
MAC’s failure to comply with the provision of their contract with the Demining group regarding 
medical provision (see Reference at the end of this file). The following has been edited for 
anonymity. 




1.   On 20 June 2000, a mine accident occurred in the Kaniaskan minefield (MAG1510062). 
The accident happened at approximately 1005 hours. 
2.   On 20 June 2000 a Board of Inquiry (BOI) was appointed to investigate the accident, with 
[a UNOPS representative] and [a representative of the Demining group] instituted as the 
members of the Board. 
Process of Investigation 
3.   The BOI formally convened on 21 June 2000, during which time the board collected 
prepared written statements and conducted separate interviews with personnel who were 
involved in the accident. 
Initial Investigation 
4.   As well as a Board of Inquiry being convened an initial investigation was ordered on 20 
Jun 00, to take place on 21 Jun 00. The investigation team consisted [the same BOI 
members]. 
6.   The victim, was interviewed by the Initial Investigation team at the Sulaimaniya 
Emergency Hospital on 21 Jun. Although in some degree of pain [the Victim] appeared to be 
alert and coherent and had little difficulty relating the events leading up to and including the 
accident. The initial investigation report is attached. 
Geography 
7.   The accident occurred in the Kaniaskan minefield, in the Halabja district. The site is 
approximately 10 km south west of Said Sadiq village. The area is a former confrontation line. 
The task is on flat to mildly undulating agricultural land (wheat).  
8.   The location where the accident happened is approximately 250 metres from the task site 
control point. The wheat is fairly dense which makes the task of looking for mines very 
difficult. 
Tasking 
9.   The [number excised] Mine Clearance Team was conducting manual demining 
operations. 
Supervision 
10.  The task was supervised by [the ex-pat Demining group] Group Supervisor. 
Communications 
11.  Communication was two way between the task site and UNOPS in Sulaimaniya.  At the 
time of the accident all means of communication were functioning effectively. 
The Mine 
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12.  The mine in this accident is the Type 72, a Chinese-made Anti-Personnel blast mine. 
Characteristics are as follows 
 a. Weight: 0.14kg 
 b. Diameter: 78.5 mm 
 c. Explosive: 51 gm net explosive weight 
Leave/Stand-down 
13.  The last official leave period for the deminers was 14 - 16 Jun 00. 
Work Timings 
14.  Work commenced that day at 0600 and concluded for 24 hours after the accident, as per 
[Demining group] SOP 1, para 1.3.7. As stated in the victims' interview, he had finished a rest 
period prior to commencing work.  
Damage 
15.  There was minor (blast) damage to the victims' vest and although repairable, due to 
blood stains will probably have to be destroyed. There was also minor blast damage to the 
helmet and visor but this should be repairable also. 
Quality Assurance 
16.  QA is conducted internally every day; however, the last time that external QA was 
conducted was 8 Jun 00. 
Kit and Equipment 
17.  All deminers at the time were wearing protective equipment i.e. vest and visor and said 
kit was worn correctly.  The damage caused to the victims' personal protection equipment as 
a result of the accident has been described already in para 15.  Medical equipment was 
available, with the medic, approximately 50 metres from the site and an ambulance was in the 
area approximately 200 metres from the accident site, in the admin area. 
18.  There was no damage caused to the mine detector or other tools and equipment besides 
that already mentioned. 
19.  It is the opinion of the board that had the vest provided better protection around the neck 
then there is a possibility that the victims' injuries may have been further reduced. In 
attachment "L" the current "Rofi Industries" vest is compared to two examples of "Tetranite 
Armour Systems" vests. The difference in neck protection is obvious; however it should be 
noted that the Tetranite vests are considerably more cumbersome, and after a period of time 
the "bib" actually folds down through normal wear and tear thus offering minimal protection. 
Medical Treatment/Medevac 
20.  The BOI has deemed that all medical treatment (at all stages) and medical evacuation 
procedures provided by [the Demining group] personnel were adhered to and performed in a 
proficient and timely manner, with little or no problems apart from insurance company 
clearance (see "conclusions"). It should be noted that GS 2 carries out regular casualty 
evacuation exercises. There was an initial delay in treatment, but this was due to the casualty 
being unable to be located as he was not in the lane (where everyone initially looks) but 
actually running out of the minefield to a clear area approximately 80 metres away. It was in 
this area that the victim was finally located and given first aid treatment. 
21.  The patient was then transported directly to Sulaimaniya Emergency hospital where he 
was stabilised, and operated on. Three days later (24 Jun 00) he was transferred to Baghdad. 
The issues requiring addressing as indicated in the report have been dealt with by the 
[Demining group] Health and Safety Supervisor, with the individuals concerned (see medical 
report from [Demining group] Health and Safety Supervisor attached). 
Revision/Refresher Training 
22.  All teams in all South Sector locations conducted the appropriate revision/refresher 
training within 24 hours of the accident occurring. The training that was conducted covered 
the following subjects; 
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a.   Confirmation of emergency procedures 
b.  Working within the 120 centimetre clearance area 
c.   Placement of equipment within cleared area; 
d.   Extraction and removal of material from the clearance lane (i.e. from excavation to 
bucket). 
Account of Accident 
23.  This account is assembled from statements and interviews taken from witnesses. 
24.  At approximately 1000 hours [the Victim] moved into the clearance lane to relieve [his 
partner], the No 1. As part of the change over drill [the partner] briefed [the Victim] on the area 
he had cleared, which included two small excavations where a reading was obtained with the 
Minelab. 
25.  After the handover was conducted, [the partner] left [the Victim] and proceeded to move 
out of the lane. It was at this time that the accident occurred. [The partner] was approximately 
six metres away from [the Victim] and moments after the detonation [the Victim] ran past [his 
partner], out of the lane and into a cleared area about 80 metres away where he was finally 
located and given initial first aid treatment. 
26.  At the time of the accident, [the Victim] was proceeding to clear away the dirt from the 
two excavations so as to have a clearer area to work in. It was during the transfer of spoil 
from the excavations to the bucket (which was behind [the Victim] at that time) that the 
accident occurred. NB: The mine was outside the clearance lane. The detonation occurred 
approximately 35 centimetres to the right hand outer edge of the clearance lane. [The Victim] 
was not investigating a "find" or a mine or UXO at the time of the accident. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Cause of the Accident 
27.  It is the opinion of the Board of Inquiry that the accident cannot be ascribed to any 
neglect, carelessness nor misconduct of any individual or group. There was also no evidence 
whatsoever of any misuse of drugs, alcohol or medication involved. All personnel involved 
complied with all applicable orders, instructions and safety precautions. 
28.  During the investigation it became apparent that there were three possible scenarios that 
could be ascribed to the actuation of the mine. They are as follows; 
a.  Most Likely:  It is most likely that during the transfer of soil from the excavation to the 
bucket that a portion (i.e a lump) of soil dropped oft the deminer’s trowel and on to the mine, 
thus causing the initiation; 
b.   Conceivable:    It is conceivable that the mine was initiated by a small animal, possibly a 
rodent, running over it and this is a possibility given that the mined area is in a wheat field 
where rodents are normally commonly found. This also concurs with the victims' statement as 
he thinks he saw a small animal on the ground immediately prior to detonation. However, he 
also states that he was not sure if it was an animal or the dirt from the trowel hitting the 
ground; and 
c.   Possible:   It is possible that the mine spontaneously detonated. This would be due to the 
area being previously burnt, thus the tops of the mines being exposed through fire damage. 
Also, after the fire damage, deterioration would be swift due to the extreme weather 
conditions (both hot and cold), and the amount of time the mine has been in the ground. It 
should also be noted that there have been incidences of sympathetic detonations during 
destruction of mines in situ in that particular minefield. 
29.  The Board, however, giving careful consideration to all three aforementioned scenario 5 
has come to the conclusion that the most likely scenario i.e. the mine actuating through dirt 
spilling from the deminers trowel on to it, is the correct one. 
30.  Although the deminer was not in the process of clearing an indication or investigating a 
mine, but preparing his area to commence his shift, the fact remains that the out-going 
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deminer should have been at the required safety distance before any type of clearance 
operation or procedure had commenced. 
31.  More attention needs to be paid to the placement of tools and equipment within the 
clearance lane. It was apparent that while the deminer had taken the trouble to place his 
equipment down in a tidy and efficient manner, there was a portion of gear lying outside the 
lane markers (1 .2m sticks). 
32.  The Board concludes that the accident may not have happened if the victim had the 
bucket in front of him whilst transferring the soil. The board also concludes that had this been 
so and the victim was kneeling instead of standing, his injuries would have been considerably 
reduced. 
33.  There was the potential for a delay in transference of the victim to a specialist eye unit in 
Baghdad as [the Demining group] had to wait for insurance company approval prior to moving 
the patient. This delay must be addressed to pre-empt this happening in the case of a life 
threatening injury. It should be noted however that the Sulaimaniya Emergency doctor was 
against moving the patient at all for at least seven to 10 days. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
34.  The Board of Inquiry recommends the following; 
a.   That no disciplinary action is taken against any member of the contractor staff; 
b.   That serious thought be given to where the deminer places his bucket whilst in the 
process of removing spoil; 
c.   The process of removing soil from an excavation to the bucket is conducted in the 
kneeling position, and within the confines of the clearance lane - no part of any deminer’s 
tools, equipment or body should be above uncleared ground. 
d.   That either the Tetranike vests or a less cumbersome version be trialled for possible 
introduction, or the Rofi vests be modified somehow to offer better neck protection. 
e.   That authority to transfer [Demining group] patients be delegated to the appropriate in-
country representative of that organisation and that the [Demining group] Health and Safety 
supervisor be solely responsible of all transference and evacuation procedures. This should 
be especially so in the case of a life threatening injury (this should also apply to both in and 
out - of - country evacuations). The board recommends that PM [Demining group] begins 
negotiations with HQ [Demining group] (London) to rectify this matter. 
Reference UNOPS contract 
The following extract of the demining group’s contract with UNOPS was appended. 
 
Medical Support Arrangements/CASEVAC Procedures 
46.  The UNOPS Programme Coordinator is responsible for establishing a Casevac and 
medevac system in accordance with the division of responsibilities in Annex A. The 
Contractor to ensure he has a qualified medical supervisor holding a current recognized 
international medical qualification in theatre. 
47.  As far as practical the Contractor is to adhere to the International Standards for 
Humanitarian Mine Clearance - Medical. Variations on the International Standards for 
Humanitarian Mine Clearance are to be approved in advance by the UNOPS Project 
Coordinator on advice from the UNOPS Sector Manager. 
48.  One trained medical orderly shall be available for each demining team and survey team. 
The Contractor shall ensure that every medical orderly has an ambulance or a safety vehicle 
capable of carrying a stretcher, which during duty hours is used for no other purpose. 
49.  UNOPS shall provide casualty evacuation to all of the Contractor's international and 
national staff to a hospital within Northern Iraq, and shall provide medical evacuation to all of 
the Contractors international staff to Baghdad and on to an acceptable medical facility within 
7 
Amman, Jordan or to Diyarbakir, Turkey. Any medical evacuation to a third country will be the 
responsibility of the Contractor. 
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